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SAVING FACE: THE BENEFITS OF NOT
SAYING I’M SORRY
BRENT T. WHITE*
I
INTRODUCTION
Nearly every day some public figure—from Don Imus1 to John McCain2 to
Miss America3—offers, or is called upon to offer, an apology. But it’s not just in
politics and Hollywood that apology reigns. Apology fever is everywhere. At
your local bookstore, you can buy any number of recent self-help books
espousing the benefits of apology and teaching you how to say the magic
words.4 Or, if you prefer, a number of new Internet ventures offer workshops
designed to teach you, or your employees, to apologize.5 If you haven’t heard,
it’s good for warding off lawsuits.6 It’s good for business too. So good, in fact,
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1. See Talk-Radio Host Don Imus Apologizes for On-Air Racial Slurs Against Rutgers Women’s
Basketball Team, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,264646,00.html
(discussing Imus’s apology following his on-air use of racial slurs).
2. See M. Broder, McCain Says He Erred on Iraq Security, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/07/washington/07mccain.html (discussing McCain’s apology for saying
that American lives had been “wasted” in Iraq).
3. See US Beauty Queen to Keep Her Title, BBC NEWS, Dec. 19, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6188537.stm (reporting that Donald Trump decided to allow
Miss USA to keep her crown after she apologized for underage drinking).
4. See, e.g., BEVERLY ENGEL, THE POWER OF APOLOGY: HEALING STEPS TO TRANSFORM ALL
YOUR RELATIONSHIPS (2001) (examining the beneficial effects of giving and receiving apologies);
GARY CHAPMAN & JENNIFER THOMAS, THE FIVE LANGUAGES OF APOLOGY: HOW TO EXPERIENCE
HEALING IN ALL YOUR RELATIONSHIPS (2006) (describing five different kinds of apology and the
people who use each one); KEN BLANCHARD & MARGRET MCBRIDE, THE ONE MINUTE APOLOGY:
A POWERFUL WAY TO MAKE THINGS BETTER (2003) (examining apologies in a managerial or
business context); MICHAEL S. WOODS, M.D., HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN
MEDICINE (2004) (examining apologies and their effects on medical doctors and patients).
5. Sorry Works!, http://www.sorryworks.net/about.phtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (claiming that
the “Sorry Works! Coalition” has quickly become the nation’s leading advocacy organization for
disclosure, apology (when appropriate), and upfront compensation (when necessary) after adverse
medical events.”); Partnerships for Patient Safety, http://www.p4ps.org/workshops.asp (last visited Oct.
4, 2008) (offering workshops to doctors on “Disclosure, Apology and Forgiveness”); World Health
Organization, Seeing Your Way Clear to Apology and Disclosure (June 6, 2007), available at
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/events/media/disclosure_brochure.pdf (offering a conference focused
on making “blame, silence, and denial a thing of the past”).
6. See Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doctors Learn to Say “I’m Sorry”—Patients’ Stories
of Hospital Errors Serve to Teach Staff, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007; at D5 (discussing a “When Things
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that at least one commercial airline employs a full-time “apology officer” whose
sole job is to craft apologies to deliver to disgruntled customers.7
Legal academia has caught the fever too. In a span of just a few years, law
reviews have published a slew of articles extolling the value of apology as a
means of resolving conflict and healing victims.8 I’ve written one myself, arguing
courts should order public officials to apologize as a civil-rights remedy.9
But I’ve grown uneasy that I, and others, have missed something in our
praise of apology. And it’s not, as some suggest, that the apparent spike in
public acts of contrition cheapens apology10—though I do admit to a bit of
apology fatigue. Nor is it that strategic apologies are insincere—as sometimes
an insincere apology will do.11 Rather, it’s that inadequate attention has been
paid to developing a nuanced understanding of resistance to apology and how
such an understanding might caution against efforts to promote apology as the
solution to individual and societal conflict.

Go Wrong: Voice of Patients and Families” training program financed in large part by Crico/RMF, a
medical-malpractice company, which teaches doctors to apologize); see also, Peter Geier, Emerging
Med-Mal Strategy: “I’m Sorry,” NAT’L L.J., July 14, 2006 (noting a drop in claims against the University
of Michigan despite an increase in hospital activity every year after implementing the Sorry Works!
Program).
7. Jeff Bailey, Airlines Learn to Fly on a Wing and an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/business/18sorry.html.
8. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
959 (1999) (offering procedures that shame offenders to prevent future corporate- and white-collar
crimes); Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004) (describing the proper use of apology in everyday life and
articulating reasons for including apology in criminal law); Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The
Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545 (2000) (contrasting the
American and Japanese uses and effects of apologies); Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice:
Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 296–98 (2001) (noting
several cases in which judges have ordered offenders to deliver public apologies); Deborah L. Levi,
Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997) (suggesting an apology during
mediation might empower the injured party, and it might heal them as well); see Jeffrey Berryman,
Reconceptualizing Aggravated Damages: Recognizing the Dignitary Interest and Referential Loss, 41
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1521, 1549–50 (2004) (considering punitive damages as a means for compensating
for lost or hurt dignity); Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 819, 820 (2002) (listing states that have or are considering barring apology evidence); Aviva
Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You
Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221 (1999) (supporting an apology exception for evidence
that accounts for feminist views of apologies); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement:
An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 463 (2003) (suggesting that apologies encourage
legal settlement); Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 187
(2000) (telling of judges who shamed convicts as a means of deterrence by ordering them to publicly
apologize).
9. Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1261 (2006).
10. See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1138
(2000) (arguing the “strategic” use of apology to facilitate dispute resolution may undermine the moral
quality of apology).
11. See White, supra note 9, at 1295.
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Roger Conner and Patricia Jordan’s account of resistance to apology in
12
Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry is thus refreshing and important. As
they explain, people strongly resist apologizing when doing so would run
counter to their deeply held beliefs. This resistance can be particularly evident
in group conflicts in which the issues are often unbounded, the groups illdefined, and both sides of a conflict often have a viable claim that they deserve
the apology.13 In such cases, Conner and Jordan rightly suggest that the best
road to reconciliation may be to skip apology and forgiveness altogether, or to
at least put them aside for awhile, and to focus instead on acknowledgment and
cooperation.14
Conner and Jordan do not account, however, for those who refuse to
apologize even when they have violated their own belief systems and who make
no claim to deserve an apology from the other.15 This situation has also received
scant attention from other legal academics. Nevertheless, it has been
suggested—without much empirical support—that many otherwise wellintentioned individuals do not apologize because they fear the apology will be
used against them in a lawsuit.16 In response, a number of states have in recent
years adopted legislation intended to encourage apology by disallowing the use
of apologies as evidence of wrongdoing.17 Other scholars have viewed an
individual’s refusal to apologize as evidence of his or her faulty character and
incapacity for remorse.18 So, for example, judges tend to punish criminal
12. Roger Conner & Patricia Jordan, Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry: Barriers to Apology by
Leaders in Group Conflicts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (Spring 2009).
13. Of course, apology is also elusive in many dyadic conflicts—where there can also be a
multitude of issues, where each party has at one point or the other deeply injured the other (divorce
cases for example) and where the attitude toward apology of each side might also be, “You First.”
14. See Conner & Jordan, supra note 12, at 253 (explaining that apologies are not effective unless
leaders work to soften negative attitudes and to create windows of opportunity to apologize). This
suggestion seems a reasonable one in the types of group conflicts that Conner and Jordan describe. But
often conflicts—both group and individual—are reasonably well-bounded and there is an identifiable
offender and victim. In such cases, skipping the apology might not only be ill-advised, but might also
make reconciliation impossible. Additionally, in a wide range of public conflicts, the goal of seeking an
apology is not reconciliation at all, but rather setting the public record straight and thereby restoring
the public face and dignity of the injured individual or group. In such cases, the demand for an apology
defines the conflict, and skipping it is not an acceptable option. See White, supra note 9, at 1262–65,
1272–73, 1295.
15. To be fair, Conner and Jordan do not purport to offer an exhaustive account of resistance to
apology.
16. See Orenstein, supra note 8, at 246 (noting people are afraid apologizing will qualify as an
admission usable in court); Robbennolt, supra note 8, at 465 (noting that fears of apologies establishing
legal liability discourage people from apologizing) .
17. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 820 (noting that, as of 2002, eight states were considering bills that
would exclude from admissibility apologetic expressions of sympathy); Shuman, supra note 8, at 188
(discussing Massachusetts evidence rules rendering inadmissible evidence related to “benevolent
gestures” to show liability in a civil action).
18. See Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Pardon My Gaffe: Effects of Sex, Status, and Consequence
Severity on Accounts, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 611 (1990) ( “[W]hen behaviors deviate
significantly from witnesses’ assumptions about what most people would do or should do, witnesses are
more willing to make assumptions about the character or disposition of the actor.”).
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offenders who refuse to apologize with harsher sentences or, conversely, to
reward offenders who do apologize with lesser ones.19
A body of experimental research by psychologists and sociologists suggests,
however, that explanations for resistance to apology that focus on offender
remorse and secondary material concerns, such as legal liability, are incomplete
at best. This socio-psychological research suggests that humans invest
significant emotional stake in “face”—or their “claimed identity as a competent,
intelligent, or moral persons”20—and apologize only when they can do so
without significant “face threat.”21
This comment briefly considers this research—which seems to have been
wholly neglected by legal scholars—and offers some preliminary conclusions as
to what legal academics and practitioners might draw from it.
II
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
When one social actor injures another, the offense potentially threatens the
faces of both the offender and the victim.22 First, the offense calls into question
the offender’s claim to a positive social identity, and, second, the offense
suggests that the victim is a lesser human being somehow deserving of
mistreatment.23 Thus, both offender and victim feel lowered self-esteem and
suffer “face damage.”24
For this damage to be repaired, the offender must engage in “corrective
facework,” which typically takes the form of an “account”25— a verbal-remedial
strategy explaining the victim’s injury.26 Accounts are generally mitigating or

19. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 8, at 93 n.19 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, comment (n.3) (2003)) (authorizing judges to consider
defendants’ acceptance of responsibility when determining sentences); see also United States v. Fagan,
162 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The commentary to Section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines
also indicates the Commission intended remorse to be a component of acceptance of responsibility.”);
United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming a district-court decision to deny
sentencing reduction because the defendant lacked genuine remorse, evidenced by her incomplete
explanation of her offense).
20. Holley S. Hodgins and Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents and
Consequences, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (2003).
21. See id. at 297 (explaining that individuals apologize only when apologizing does not pose an
intolerable face threat).
22. See Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Explaining Our Sins: Factors Influencing Offender Accounts
and Anticipated Victim Responses, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 958, 958 (1992) (noting
predicaments threaten the face of all interactants).
23. See id. (describing how accidents, negligence, and intentional acts affect victims’ and offenders’
faces).
24. See Holley S. Hodgins et al., Getting Out of Hot Water: Facework in Social Predicaments, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 300 (1996) (noting all parties’ faces are threatened when one
party fails to observe accepted conventions).
25. Id.
26. Gonzales et al., supra note 18, at 610.
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aggravating to victims. An account mitigates to the extent that it ameliorates
the victim’s face concerns; it aggravates to the extent that it further threatens
the victim’s face.27 Accounts generally fit into a four-part typology: concessions
(or apologies), excuses, justifications, or refusals.28 This typology is a continuum,
with concessions being the most mitigating to victims but the most threatening
to offenders, and refusals being the most aggravating to victims but the most
protective of the offender’s own face.29 Victims who receive concessions or valid
excuses from offenders usually feel better, frequently forgive, and rarely file
lawsuits. Victims given justifications or refusals often respond with anger. Some
sue.30
Perhaps because offenders’ failing to apologize carries a significant risk of
future harm, studies have demonstrated a “vigorous human preference to
apologize.”31 Such studies suggest a “shared norm of apologetic discourse as the
appropriate response when another is harmed.”32
But this preference for apology has important caveats. Much evidence, for
example, suggests that “[f]ace needs for the self and others seem to compete,
and when [one’s] own face threat increases above some [tolerable]
threshold . . . , [a] defensive motivation [dominates].”33
Although various factors may increase face threat above this threshold for
all individuals, on a basic psychological level, individuals have different
tolerances for face threats.34 Some people “respond defensively at even the
suggestion of their imperfection, whereas others remain calm” even under harsh
criticism.35 An individual’s tolerance for face threat corresponds roughly with his
or her level of inner-directed self-esteem. Individuals with high inner-directed
self-esteem can more easily acknowledge their flaws because they believe
fundamentally that they are reasonable and decent people.36 When such people
apologize, they are merely admitting, in their minds, that they made a mistake,

27. Id.
28. “Concessions take full responsibility without offering extenuating circumstances.” Excuses
acknowledge harm but “offer qualifying factors that reduce responsibility.” Justifications admit the
behavior “but seek to redefine the behavior as legitimate.” Refusals deny any responsibility. Id.
29. Id.; Gonzales et al., supra note 22, at 959.
30. See Shuman, note 8, at 184 (offering empirical evidence that injured patients are dramatically
less likely to sue when their doctors sincerely apologize).
31. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 312.
32. Id.
33. Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 298.
34. See C. Raymond Knee & Miron Zuckerman, A Nondefensive Personality: Autonomy and
Control as Moderators of Defensive Coping and Self-Handicapping, 32 J. RES. PERSONALITY 115, 125
(1998) (noting persons with high autonomy-motivation- and low control-motivation orientation
engaged in less-defensive coping than everyone else).
35. Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 298.
36. See Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 118 (citing research that shows people who are selfdetermined do not tend to employ avoidant strategies when confronting negative events).
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which does not threaten their identity.37 In psychological jargon, such
nondefensive individuals are highly self-determined—or are high on autonomymotivation orientation and low on control-motivation orientation.38
In contrast, some individuals find it nearly impossible to apologize—even
when they feel terrible about their actions. For these individuals, verbally
acknowledging they behaved in a hurtful manner makes them hurtful people.39
Concerned about “feeling weak, incompetent, defeated, guilty, ashamed,
emotional, [or] like a loser,”40 they use such defensive and self-protective
“avoidant strategies” as denial or disengagement to “defend the[ir] fragmented
sel[ves] from personal awareness.”41 Such actions often make them appear
unremorseful.42 In actuality, however, such individuals are low in selfdetermination, or low on autonomy-motivation orientation and high on controlmotivation orientation, which makes apologizing especially difficult—even, and
especially, when they feel great shame about their actions.43
Apart from personality differences, however, certain socio-psychological
factors increase face threat for all individuals, thereby making them less likely
to apologize. These factors include blameworthiness, reproach-severity, public
exposure, and relative offender–victim status.
First, all offenders are less likely to apologize when they are especially
blameworthy. Some offenses—such as unavoidable accidents—“reveal nothing
noteworthy about the offenders.”44 In contrast, other offenses—such as sexual
assault—are “highly diagnostic of the offenders’ defective character.”45
Individuals who intentionally wrong others are much less likely to apologize
than those who negligently do so because “undeniably guilty perpetrators [of
intentional wrongful acts] cannot claim positive social identity.”46 Thus, they
37. See ENGEL, supra note 4, at 48 (noting those with healthy self-esteem bounce back quickly
from remorse or shame).
38. See Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 116. Autonomy orientation refers to the tendency to
initiate behavior out of choices based on an awareness of one’s needs, feelings, and integrated goals.”
Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 301. “[C]ontrol orientation describes the tendency to seek out external
controls and experience events as pressures that determine behavior and feelings.” Id.
39. AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 163 (2004).
40. Id.
41. Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 118 “Denial involves denying that the event is occurring,
behavioral disengagement involves ceasing to try to deal with the event, and mental disengagement
involves immersing oneself in other activities to avoid thinking about the event.” Id. at 119.
42. See ENGEL, supra note 4, at 48 (noting that people with low self-esteem may rapidly put up
emotional walls “of steel” that make them appear unaffected by the pain of those they hurt).
43. See Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 117–19 (noting that self-determined individuals will
stray away from using strategies that deny negative, self-actualization events). Every human has “both
autonomy and control motivation orientations.” Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 299.
Individual differences in defensiveness “are a function of differing strengths of these two orientations.”
Id. But the “use of defensive attributions” to some degree characterizes everyone, except perhaps those
few with “optimal psychological development.” Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 117.
44. Gonzales et al., supra note 22, at 958.
45. Id.
46. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 301.
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often “feel especially threatened and provide defensive, self-protective
accounts” rather than suffer further loss of face by apologizing.47
Additionally, offenders who are harshly reproached, whether by victims or
others, are less likely to acknowledge wrongdoing than those given the
opportunity to apologize of their own accord. This is because severe reproach
directly challenges the offender’s behavior and squarely calls into question the
offender’s social identity.48 “When victims deliver scathing reproaches,
perpetrators may experience face threat beyond the taint of their own ill
behavior. An apology that might have been given freely by a perpetrator willing
to acknowledge ineptitude comes more difficult after being labeled a cad or a
louse.”49 Alternatively, a gentle rebuke that conveys belief in the offender’s
inherent goodness may enable him “to respond from the protective orientation,
offer mitigation for the victim’s face threat, and provide the best hope for
reconciliation.”50
Under this “symbolic interactions” framework, a victim who severely
reproaches an offender and so ignores her “face needs” will likely receive “an
aggravating account.” This will lead to the victim’s own “harsh evaluation” and
further reproach.51 “[A]t each phase, one person’s lack of facework for the other
escalates conflict and decreases the likelihood of [apology and] forgiveness.”52
Paradoxically, though apologies are especially critical for victims of
intentionally grievous acts, offenders who commit such acts are the least likely
to willingly express contrition—leading to severe victim reproach, further
defensiveness, and further escalation of the conflict.53
Relatedly, when grievous acts unfold in the public domain, victims often feel
they need an apology to restore their public face and are thus more likely to
issue a severe public reproach.54 Yet a transgressor who is publically reproached
suffers collective judgment, and a public apology risks leaving them naked,
defenseless, and open to the multitude’s scrutiny.55 The “movement from

47. Id. Offenders who are highly culpable often resort instead to “extreme” accounting strategies.
Id. One study found that in the face of having committed blameworthy acts, approximately one-third of
individuals told “outright fabrications.” Id. at 308. However, despite its prevalence, lying is a
particularly hazardous strategy for refusing responsibility because if exposed it becomes “extremely
difficult for liars to restore face.” Id. Thus, having lied, offenders become even less likely to come clean
and apologize. Id.
48. See id. (noting that an apology is harder to give after the offender has been negatively labeled).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 313.
52. Id.
53. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 311 (noting that high-blame offenders took defensive postures
because they “envisioned negative repercussions of predicaments for future relationships with
victims”).
54. Id.
55. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 70
(1991).
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private to public thus radically alters the interaction,” increases the offender’s
face threat, and leaves less “discursive space” for apology or forgiveness.56
Finally, whether the offense is public or private, offenders are more likely to
apologize to high-status victims than to low-status ones.57 Offenders “expend
more effort to preserve relationships with high-status victims” because highstatus victims “have social power and control potentially important outcomes.”58
On the other hand, high-status offenders have little incentive to attend to lowstatus victims’ face needs. Indeed, a victim’s low status likely played a role in an
offender’s decision to inflict harm in the first place. In such situations, the
victim’s and offender’s relative social status may be the decisive factor in
whether the offender apologizes.59
III
CONCLUSIONS
The above research on the role of face concern in offender willingness to
apologize offers several lessons to legal scholars and practitioners.
First, criminal offenders, many of whom are likely to be low on selfdetermination, may resist apology to victims out of psychological fragility and
the psychological need to preserve face rather than lack of remorse. Thus, the
criminal-justice system should be cautious about punishing offenders more
harshly because they fail to show external remorse—or even when they are
openly defiant. This caution should be exercised whether the system explicitly
punishes offenders more harshly—for example, as Professor O’Hara advocates,
by giving victims power to extend offender’s sentences for not apologizing60—or
implicitly, by giving lighter sentences to those who publicly apologize. Such
practices not only risk unfairness in the treatment of equally remorseful
offenders but also effectively coerce apologies—which, because they are
involuntary, are unlikely to promote healthy psychological growth among
offenders and may instead elevate an offender’s psychological resistance toward
accepting responsibility.
Second, because highly blameworthy offenders resist apologizing primarily
to preserve face, statutes excluding apologies from evidence in order to
encourage private apologies are unlikely to increase the incidence of apology
when offenders are grossly negligent or reckless or intentionally harm another.
For example, although statutes excluding apologies from evidence may
56. Id. at 70.
57. See Gonzales et al., supra note 18, at 619 (noting offenders are less concerned with the faces of
low-status victims); Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 303 (noting offenders should expend more effort to
preserve relationships with high-status victims).
58. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 302–03.
59. Id. at 313.
60. See Erin Ann O’Hara & Maria Mayo Robbins, Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both
Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 208 (Spring 2009) (proposing portions of
sentence terms be enforced at the victim’s option).
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encourage doctors to apologize when negative medical outcomes were beyond
their control, these statutes may have little effect when the doctor was grossly
incompetent or reckless or provided care below widely accepted standards. In
such cases, apologizing would call into question the doctor’s identity as a
competent and caring professional—a claimed identity that is likely central to
his sense of self and also to his standing in the medical community. From a
socio-psychological standpoint, denial rather than apology may be the better
strategy.61 In other words, most doctors will find it more beneficial to claim a
valid lawsuit is groundless (thereby benefiting from the popular animosity
toward “frivolous” lawsuits), than to lose face by admitting to medical
malpractice.
Third, because harsh reproach increases offender face threat and thus
decreases the likelihood that the offender will apologize, legal practitioners who
represent victims who ultimately desire a sincere apology and reconciliation
should reproach offenders in a manner that conveys an underlying belief in the
offender’s inherent goodness. It is also preferable, when possible, to issue
reproach in private rather than in public.
Finally, because high-status offenders are unlikely to apologize to low-status
victims, particularly when reproached publically, government officials are
unlikely to voluntarily apologize when they injure marginalized groups or
individuals. Thus, although forced apology may be ineffective in changing
individual behavior, courts should consider ordering government officials to
apologize when a public apology is necessary to set the public record straight or
to restore the dignity of the injured person or group.62

61. See Gonzales et al., supra note 18, at 619 (“[T]ransgressors who knowingly and willingly violate
widely held norms . . . have relatively more to lose by accepting full or partial responsibility for a
predicament and acknowledging the accuracy of victims’ interpretations and their right to issue
reproaches.”).
62. Public apologies, unlike private interpersonal apologies, serve an essential function in defining
both social reality and official truth. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 55, at 71 (noting that the overriding
interest in public apology is, “to put the apology ‘on record,’ that is, to extract a public, chronicled
recantation that restores those aspects of the collectivity’s [or individual’s] integrity and honor called
into question by the offense.”).

